Employer liability remains, technically, zero. PERS is "independent" for purposes of being able to invest in private equities. It is as independent as if the pension trust were a trust division of Bank of America.

The employer contributions to cover losses is unlawful, and I would say is a criminal misuse of public office, just as if the Bank Of America came to the legislature and pleaded for a hand out after having made foolish investments or paid top executives far too much. The AG could not, in response to a law suit by the Bank of America, just jump up and roll over and admit liability and thus force the state and every local government to cut a check to Bank of America.

That characterization is precisely because of the PERF/OIC investments in private equities.

Do not exclude the possibility that PERS is fully and completely terminated and the fund is confined to the funds in the PERF at a snapshot in time, exclusive of ALL UAL bonds and ALL employer contributions delivered unlawfully as supposedly compelled cover for private investments.

The excess undistributed earnings above 8 percent, in the future, cannot go to the government accounts and it would be equally criminal for the government to NOT distribute such gains on private investments.

The gap between a sound independent fund and an arbitrary mess -- a mess that is left to the whims of politicians and lawyers babbling among themselves -- is growing wider and wider as time goes by.

Given the existence of judicial determinations, right or wrong, that annuity payments are to be treated as final -- the treatment of investments are of greatest concern to actives. The SC are judges, and even if they were monkeys writing plays the law is what they say it is.

Think of my perspective as representing the new non-tier-one and non-tier-two hires.

http://www.pdxape.us/

I want a sound independent plan going forward, or the right to fully and completely opt out of PERS entirely.

The net result is a demand to eliminate all the arbitrariness or in the alternative to fully terminate PERS and reduce all obligations to fixed and measurable things that are completely amenable to judicial determination, which invariably eliminates the possibility for the government to assume the risk of loss for investments in private equities at variance with Sprague v. Straub.

Do not exclude the interests of the newest hires and newest members of PERS. This is the kind of thing that is missing from a truly adversarial judicial proceeding. The lawyers know that this is not really at the outer limits but is more closely tied to a reasonable and judicially supportable position, and particularly for judges that have to face elections.

If I could find the Investment Banker and Bond Issuance companies, and their head pigs, that are convincing the AG's office to justify the State Treasure's issuance of 200 million dollars in Pension Obligation Bonds on September 13, 2005, and hold them accountable, I would. They are convincing the state and it's subdivisions to play a game of double or nothing in the stock market. A prerequisite in bringing a RICO action is the prospect of the continuation of a corrupt enterprise in the absence of the RICO action to put a stop to it. This new Pension Obligation Bond scheme is just such a continuation element.

The interests of retirees is different from the actives with regard to these bonding and "employer contribution" issues. A case could be made that the interests of retirees is fully and completely independent to the manner of how the government funds the obligation to cover future payments. The Strunk case did not give any new justification to the need to issue bonds today to cover a payment that is not due in a future budge cycle. The Strunk case did not eliminate the possibility that a later case could effectively arise that would find that the raising of the bonds and the distribution of investment gains are incompatible with the constitutional provisions regarding the lawful means for making appropriations.

While the legal claims of retirees are now, sort of, decoupled from the bonds by virtue of judicial determinations they remain a highly political element in the presentation of the matters before the public, in the context of elections (triggering an ORICO provision pertaining to elections).

I should bring a suit on these new bonds, on behalf of the interests of the newest public employee hires and the public.

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Earlier note:

One, public pay for work must be full and complete at the time of the original pay checks.

Two, there shall be no risk that a pension manager or trustee shall come back later and demand extra pay that was not part of the original paycheck and thus not provide any opportunity or excuse for the issuance of pension obligation bonds.
[ What Are The Features Of Genuine Oregon Public Employee Pension Reform? - PDXNAG.COM ]

And a note invoking the notion of Equal Privileges and Immunities too:

Suppose that Oregon created a retirement safety net for all; so as to be consistent with equal privileges and immunities under state law. We would each be eligible to deposit up to a specific dollar amount each year, regardless of income. Folks moving into the state or leaving the state could catchup or fully withdraw so as not to violate the freedom to travel under the US Constitution. We would each have an account with an actual number attached to it, rather than a vested interest in some indeterminate benefit that is adjusted ad hoc along the way. A resident that had not participated along the way could buy in, or someone who had participated could fully withdraw; we would rely on state tax laws to get people to join and to not withdraw. The tax implications would be pegged to gradual withdrawal in old age, but the terms (tax modifications) for withdrawal would make no distinction between any class of participants, other than age.
[ Oregon's New Pension Plan For All Residents . . . It Is Not a State Bank, it is Just a Pension. - PDXNAG.COM ]